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Abstract: The paper addresses the nature of duties grounded in human rights. I contend 
that rather than being protections against harm, per se, human rights largely shield against 
risk impositions to protected interests. “Risk imposition” is a normative idea requiring 
explication, but understanding dutiful action in its terms enables human rights to provide 
prospective policy guidance, hold institutions accountable, operate in nonideal circum-
stances, embody impartiality among persons, and define the moral status of agencies in 
international relations. Slightly differently, I indicate a general understanding of dutiful 
action that permits human rights to see to the tasks of an institutional morality. 
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How does one violate human rights? Otherwise asked, what manner of 
duty does a human right ground? Despite the recent philosophical inter-
est in human rights, we do not yet have an adequate answer. Here are 
some kinds of human rights claims that we make: 
 
(1) Country X is a human rights-respecting state.  
(2) International lending agency Y has violated people Z’s human right 
to an adequate standard of living by requiring Z’s state to privatize 
water services, thereby reducing access to clean water.  
(3) P is torturing Q, and consequently, Q’s human rights are being vio-
lated. 
(4) Economic sanction/act of war/international policy S is leading to se-
vere material deprivation, thus S constitutes a human rights violation. 
(5) Polity T only occasionally investigates allegations of sexual assault 
against women, and even less occasionally prosecutes suspects, and 
consequently violates the human rights of women. 
 
With regard to each, what facts would we need to know in order to re-
gard the assertion as justified? These sorts of claims frequent official and 
unofficial political forums,1 and we should want philosophical theorizing 
                                                        
 1Most of the above could be framed in terms of rights identified in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). I will largely reference less controversial human 
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about human rights to illuminate the conditions of their justified asserta-
bility,2 as well as the normative consequences of their correctness. Without 
such clarification, human rights discourse is threatened with the sense that 
it is mere diversionary talk, purely a language of political aspiration, simp-
ly another ideological instrument of politics, or meaningless and empty. 
Important problems have received attention and analytical clarification, 
but it still remains uncertain which kinds of facts are generally relevant 
for assessing the above-indicated types of claims. Put otherwise, it is un-
clear what we have to know about the world in order to discern that any 
human right has been violated (excusably or not, justifiably or not). 
 As a preface, I argue that human rights violations ought to be largely 
understood as, at base, risk impositions. The relevant facts for assessing 
human rights claims are those that pertain to the imposition of risk. “Risk 
imposition” requires analysis, but the view can be briefly summarized as 
follows. The requirements of human rights play a conceptual role analo-
gous to that of the standard of care in negligence law. To bear a duty of 
care in tort is to owe a context-sensitive degree of risk mitigation to an-
other, such that failure wrongs the right-holder and modifies the norma-
tive situation of both parties. For instance, the duty-bearer is now liable 
for any injuries to the wronged consequent of the risk imposed, and the 
right-bearer can seek recourse for any such injuries. Similarly, those 
bearing human rights duties normally fail by inadequate precaution, 
thereby wronging rights-bearers and modifying the moral situation of the 
parties. The analogy is not perfect, as the normative consequences at is-
sue will differ between the cases in important respects, but as with the 
standard of care in tort, the risk-based requirement enables human rights 
to meaningfully perform as an operational normative system regulating 
large domains of human institutional life. Such an analysis can explain, 
moreover, the propriety of the language of “standard threats” found in 
much human rights theory. 
 
 
1. Introduction: Against Simple Deprivation 
 
The problem for human rights may not be obvious. Here is an attractive-
ly simple view: the fact of someone’s torture, for instance, is the fact we 
                                                                                                                            
rights, since it is not my aim to settle which human rights we have.  
 2A point well made by Nicole Hassoun: see “Some Reflections on the Moral Dimen-
sions of Human Rights,” Jurisprudence 3 (2012): 253-62. Though Hassoun takes a legit-
imacy-based rather than human rights-based approach to protecting the autonomy of the 
vulnerable, her discussion of the institutional context in which we are tempted to make 
claims of human rights is nicely illustrated in her Globalization and Global Justice: Shrink-
ing Distance, Expanding Obligations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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need to know in order to recognize the relevant human rights violation. 
More generally, if we know I have a human right against (or to) some 
sort of treatment, then being so treated (or not being so treated) consti-
tutes a violation. We will know the relevant facts upon discernment of 
which human rights we have—the salient facts will be settled by an ade-
quate formulation of the right. 
 The apparent simplicity is evasive rather than illuminating, and trades 
in on the fact that the right against torture appears to concretely explicate 
the corresponding duty. Leaving less specific human rights temporarily 
aside, even this apparently straightforward right involves unacknowl-
edged complexity, and not because (if it is the case) torture may be justi-
fiable in rare circumstances—that is, that there may be justifiable human 
rights violations. Compare two circumstances. Polity A is well-governed 
by the rule of law, and equitably and adequately protects personal securi-
ty. Polity B inadequately or inequitably protects personal security by fail-
ing, for instance, to reliably investigate crimes in a certain region. If 
someone in Polity A decides, in his private capacity, to kidnap and tor-
ture a neighbor, perhaps we would impute a human rights violation to 
him, but probably not to his polity (if it is appropriately responsive to the 
crime, and so on). If a person so acts in Polity B, where there has been a 
spate of recent similar acts, then whatever we say about the torturer, we 
are much more inclined to impute a violation to the polity. The simple 
view cannot explain the difference in the assessment of the polities. Both 
circumstances involve tortures where the victim had a human right 
against torture against the polity. As an alternative to the simple view, we 
can say that Polity B ought to protect its subjects from standard threats 
to their interest(s) in not being tortured, and we have some evidence (B’s 
institutional practice and the fact of the tortured neighbor) that it failed 
precisely in this respect. The idea of standard threats, here, permits us to 
differentiate harms that implicate institutional human rights violations 
from those that do not.  
 Consider also rights where the general formulation offers less guid-
ance as to what is concretely required (e.g., rights to life, bodily integrity, 
personal liberty, an adequate standard of living, and so on). Perhaps the 
challenge is to make formulations more specific, and better indicative of 
which duties each right grounds, but this requires a principled approach 
—even if we have settled the underlying interests that human rights 
properly protect. Not all human-caused setbacks to bodily integrity will 
register as human rights violations, nor will all such deaths. A fatal traf-
fic accident, in the circumstance of reasonably safe regulation and ab-
sence of personal negligence, is not a human rights violation. So, what 
duties regarding bodily integrity and life do the relevant human rights 
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ground? Again, part of the challenge here is to differentiate harms to pro-
tected interests indicative of a human rights violation from harms to pro-
tected interests that are not.3 These pedestrian examples show that the 
simple view is inadequate to the task, and so must be substantially modi-
fied or abandoned.  
 I argue that human rights violations largely do not require that some-
one suffer serious harm by another’s agency. Injury to interests protected 
by human rights is neither necessary nor sufficient for a human rights 
violation. Rather, human rights violations are typically agential failures 
concerning risks to protected interests. Somewhat differently, I contend 
that the proper explication of “standard threats” largely provides the re-
sources for understanding what human rights requires of its duty-bearers.4 
Since Henry Shue’s Basic Rights, the term “standard threats” has occa-
sioned human rights theory, but it has not received sustained analysis or 
defense.5 We should fill this theoretical gap, for several reasons. First, we 
need a clear understanding of why a standard-threats approach is appro-
priate, compared to alternatives. I argue that it is capable of addressing 
the just identified problem for the simple view, and alone invokes the 
kind of considerations capable of providing prospective guidance for 
large arenas of social policy. Second, if one violates human rights by 
failing with respect to standard threats, then the idea requires determina-
cy. Without clarification here, we do not know what would have to be 
true of the world in order to warrant the types of claims stated initially—
even if we have resolved which human rights we have, what interests 
they protect, who can bear their duties, and what normative consequenc-
es follow their violation. I provide an analysis that says, roughly, human 
rights violations consist in the increase of risk to dignity interests above 
an acceptable background level. To possess a human right, then, is to at 
least possess a claim against an agent to a background level of risk, as 
                                                        
 3This example also shows us that mere appeal to standard threats, without a substan-
tive account of the idea, is also inadequate to the task. On the face of it, a standard threat 
of modern systems of transport is death by the normal use of automobiles. 
 4A full account of what human rights require, from an all-things-considered point of 
view, would need a discussion of justifications, excuses, and consent. Here I am concerned 
with what counts as wrongful conduct, with respect to human rights, in the first place.  
 5Shue declines to fully explicate the idea, though it plays a basic role in his analysis 
of rights. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 191 n. 22. Nickel too adopts the idea, 
emphasizing that human rights protect against experienced dangers to basic human inter-
ests. See James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 70-74. Donnelly and Beitz also employ the concept. See 
Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
pp. 109-12, and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 97-99. 
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opposed to a claim to the satisfaction of an interest. Third, a sharper pic-
ture of the idea of standard threats contributes, I will argue, to human 
rights’ capacity to perform important functions of a political morality. In 
the international sphere, for instance, many appeal to human rights to 
help settle the proper scope of state sovereignty and permissibility of in-
tervention, the justness of war, the propriety of official condemnation of 
state policy, the legitimacy of trade and lending arrangements, whether a 
polity is deserving of international recognition, and so on. I show that the 
standard of right conduct supplied by a proper analysis of “standard 
threats” facilitates this role.  
 I should here emphasize that my primary concern with human rights 
is in its aspect as an institutional morality. I take no stance as to whether 
human rights provide standards for interpersonal conduct, or whether 
they perform some other important function. In any case, human rights 
discourse purports to set standards for permissible institutional conduct 
both to guide institutional policy and to hold institutions accountable. My 
account is consciously focused, then, on the features human rights moral-
ity must possess in order to even be potentially adequate to these tasks. 
Human rights claims are prominent features of political life, and much 
theory is dedicated to them. Moreover, if such claims can be shown to 
amount to something, we might have a valuable normative perspective 
by which to evaluate institutions. Their perceived importance and poten-
tial value should motivate us to consider what it would mean for an insti-
tution to take them seriously, that is, what must be true about the charac-
ter of human rights’ demands for human rights to serve as an institutional 
morality.  
 
 
2. Human Rights Claims: A Schema 
 
“Standard threats” concerns one element of the idea of human rights, so I 
should briefly schematize what a claim to a human right involves. No 
summary elaboration will be wholly uncontroversial, but I hope to frame 
things in a way that rests comfortably with much extant literature. A hu-
man right is a moral, nontransactionally grounded, moderately social 
context-insensitive, and difficult to alienate claim-right possessed in vir-
tue of some aspect of the status of being human. A human right is not 
identical with any posited norm (e.g., a legal norm),6 nor is its existence 
                                                        
 6Which is not to say that the idea of human rights ought not be sensitive to the actual 
political practice of human rights. See James Griffin, On Human Rights (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 9-32; Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, pp. 1-47; Joseph Raz, 
“Human Rights without Foundations,” in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The 
Philosophy of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), chap. 15. 
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grounded in a transaction between parties (e.g., a promise or contract). 
Human rights may be universally held, though perhaps they can be 
somewhat sensitive to social conditions such that, for example, a right to 
advanced education is only operative in certain societal circumstances. In 
any case, a human right is claimable in a wide variety of social venues. 
Human rights may be inalienable, but if not, only a possessor can abdi-
cate and only under stringent conditions (e.g., full information and com-
plete voluntariness). A human right is a claim-right7 possessed in virtue 
of some aspect of the status of being human. I will offer more on this 
shortly, but to say it is a claim-right is to indicate that another has at least 
one corresponding duty, and that failure to carry out the duty wrongs the 
right-holder. Frequently, the capacity for or possession of human dignity 
(somehow interpreted) is seen as the ground for human rights. 
 Much theory is devoted to the last matter: the moral grounds of hu-
man rights. Prominent suggestions include an interest in normative agen-
cy,8 the capacity for distinctively human flourishing,9 basic interests pro-
tected by the core of justice,10 equal concern and respect for personal 
responsibility,11 a more basic right to justification requiring mutual re-
spect,12 and a plurality of important human interests of fundamental con-
cern to international politics.13 I avoid taking sides in this dispute, and, 
since these are frequently offered as interpretations of human dignity, 
will simply say that some aspect of human dignity protects certain hu-
man interests by imposing obligations on others. We can now offer a 
schema: to claim there is a human right is to say that there is some inter-
est (or interests) that is protected by a duty in another specifying a stand-
ard of behavior. A human right involves at least a: (1) protected interest, 
(2) duty, (3) duty-bearer, and (4) standard of conduct. Each element can 
be investigated separately. As we saw above, we can focus on the charac-
                                                        
 7Though, as Wellman notes, human rights frequently involve other Hohfeldian pow-
ers. See Carl Wellman, The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 41-51. My focus will be on human rights’ aspect as claim-
rights. 
 8Griffin, On Human Rights. 
 9Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review 66 
(1997): 273-300. See also Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2009).  
 10Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations 
for International Law, paperback ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 11Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), pp. 332-39. 
 12Rainer Forst, “The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justifi-
cation: A Reflexive Approach,” Ethics 120 (2010): 711-40. 
 13John Tasioulas, “Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights,” Current Legal Problems 
65 (2012): 1-30. 
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ter of the protected interests, normally in a way that would illuminate 
why they could be a source of duties.14 We can also ask (in general) what 
it is to be under a duty.15 Or, we can consider who or what can and 
should be a bearer of human rights duties.16 Knowing all this, we would 
still not know the behavior prescribed or proscribed by the duty for the 
bearer. I consider (4) here.17  
 My claim, then, is that a proper explication of the idea of standard 
threats helps indicate what, in large part, human rights morality requires 
of its duty-bearers.18 So framed, positing the relevance of standard threats 
is not to suggest a constraint on the extent of human rights duties (such 
that human rights duties could be more demanding absent the con-
straint).19 It is, on my view, to offer an account of what a human rights 
                                                        
 14I use the term “interest” as nearly all recent human rights theories are articulated in 
terms of interests or a cognate (e.g., capabilities facilitative of human flourishing). How-
ever, I do not intend to take a stand on the will/interest debate concerning rights. I believe 
my formulations could be adapted to other theories. 
 15See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 61-78. 
 16Compare Griffin, Beitz, and Pogge: James Griffin, “Human Rights and the Auton-
omy of International Law,” in Besson and Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of Inter-
national Law, chap. 16, pp. 343-47; Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, pp. 13, 108-9; 
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 
2008), pp. 50-57. Importantly, answering the question of who is, in principal, a candidate 
for bearing human rights duties would still leave us with the pressing question of which 
candidate agents actually bear the duties. See Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 97-142. For two responses to O’Neill’s 
concerns, see Elizabeth Ashford, “The Inadequacy of Our Traditional Conception of the 
Duties Imposed by Human Rights,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19 
(2006): 217-35; Adam Etinson, “Human Rights, Claimability, and the Uses of Abstrac-
tion,” Utilitas 25 (2013): 463-86. 
 17My agnosticism about the grounds of human rights and the nature of human dignity 
is appropriate for two reasons. First, what I say here is consistent with a variety of views 
about the moral grounds of human rights, i.e., with various understandings of human 
dignity and its capacity to generate obligations in others. Slightly differently, it addresses 
a problem common to many theories. Second, I focus on core rights, considering what 
standard of conduct would be serviceable for them. Such rights include a right to life, 
bodily integrity, due process, freedom of religion, liberty of person, and so on. The sorts 
of interests in question are likely desiderata for an account of human dignity, such that it 
would count against a theory if it did not have the result that they are protected. Undoubt-
edly there are other protected interests, and precisely which ones will depend on the best 
account of dignity. Yet, we need a standard for the core interests, at the very least, if hu-
man rights are to be a viable political morality. The analysis can likely be extended to 
other interests once a theory of dignity is adopted. 
 18“In large part” in that I am here excepting prohibitions on intentional harming, 
which plausibly are also part of the demands of human rights. I discuss this in section 
3.b.3. 
 19An interpretation suggested by Hassoun. She says: “It is not clear, however, that 
[accounts of human rights] should be constrained in the absence of good practical reasons 
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duty amounts to in the first place. Human rights largely do not require 
that an agent avoid harming the protected interest or that an agent protect 
against all threats to an interest. I argue that the norm is to protect against 
standard threats, properly understood. 
 
 
3. To Protect Against Standard Threats 
 
3.a. Why “standard threats”? 
 
As I have mentioned, understanding human rights as protections against 
standard threats is not, by itself, new. Undoubtedly, some of the attrac-
tion of the approach arises from feasibility considerations in matters of 
institutional governance.20 Most think that states, for instance, have hu-
man rights duties, and it is simply not feasible for states to refrain from 
all harming or to protect against all threats. We can expect protection 
from the predictable threats of modern life to human dignity where the 
responsible agency is reasonably capable of offering protection in a way 
that does not violate other moral constraints.21 This is a reasonable point, 
especially for the political practice of human rights, yet straightforward 
appeals to feasibility are ambiguous—they may simply indicate strong 
justifications for not living up to what human rights require. We might 
speak in terms of standard threats to human dignity to partly summarize 
when we justifiably, given other moral political considerations, do not do 
what human rights strictly demand (e.g., protect against all threats to au-
tonomy). People are still wronged, regrettably, in terms of their human 
rights, but this is often justified, all things considered. Somewhat differ-
ently, it is unclear what role feasibility is playing in grounding the pro-
priety of standard threats discourse: is it settling the standard of right 
conduct with respect to human rights, or is it summarizing considerations 
that normally justify departures from the standard?22 
                                                                                                                            
for constraining them. Suppose autonomy grounds the importance of human rights. Then, 
perhaps, rights should protect individuals’ ability to secure whatever they need for auton-
omy, unless there are equally strong considerations that justify exceptions.” Hassoun, 
Globalization and Global Justice, p. 25. Hassoun merely offers this as a passing sugges-
tion, but this would be, in my view, to give an alternative account of what human rights 
require.  
 20See, e.g., Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, p. 111. 
 21Ibid., pp. 111-12. 
 22Does it matter? Yes, for at least three reasons. First, a theoretically accurate under-
standing is itself valuable, insofar as we want to simply understand this aspect of our 
normative discourse. Second, inaccuracy or imprecision in one region of theorizing can 
negatively impact other areas when our concern shifts—e.g., when we begin to consider 
when we may justifiably depart from the demands of human rights. Third, if we are nor-
mally justifiably violating human rights, then this could significantly affect what our 
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 “Standard threats” should be seen as specifying the requirements of 
human rights, and we can see why once we attend to a general difficulty 
the natural rights tradition faces regarding risk. Traditionally, natural 
rights are understood as forbidding some determinate outcome (e.g., 
physical harm, death, unconsented property loss), or requiring the pro-
curement of some determinate outcome (e.g., rescue, or nourishment of a 
child into adulthood). Yet, we typically decide where we can only, at best, 
estimate the probable outcomes of an action. Moreover, nearly everything 
one does creates at least a small risk of harm to others. My morning cof-
fee could spell death by gas explosion for my neighbor.23 What does an-
other’s right to bodily integrity say, then, about my imposition of risk of 
bodily harm? To say that I cannot permissibly impose any risk of harm is 
implausible, as it rules out as wrongful almost any activity—especially 
when we begin to think at the level of social policy. What else the natural 
rights theorist should say is unclear.24 It is worth quoting Shelly Kagan at 
length to illustrate the difficulty, as it sets up part of the paper’s task: 
 
Imagine that there is a gizmo attached to my electric harpoon, with a dial marked off in 
gradations from 0 percent to 100 percent. As I move the dial down from 100 toward 0, I 
effectively decrease the likelihood that the harpoon will actually fire when I squeeze the 
trigger. Does the constraint [against harming] permit me to pull the trigger when there is 
only a 90 percent chance of killing my given victim? What about 89 percent? It seems 
that the defender of the constraint against doing harm can only offer two sorts of answers 
… He can pick some general cutoff point, and claim that, say, the constraint only forbids 
a 73 percent or greater chance of doing harm … But this first response, obviously, is 
hopelessly arbitrary … If we rule out this sort of cutoff response, however, then it seems 
that the defender of the constraint must answer instead that any chance of doing harm … 
would be forbidden by the constraint … But this second response would simply lead to 
                                                                                                                            
attitudes towards the wronged ought to be (compared to a situation in which rights are not 
being violated). Frequently, wronging someone with respect to his moral rights, even 
justifiably, requires a reparative response (e.g., compensation, or an apology). 
 23Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Imposing Risks,” in Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays 
in Moral Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 11. 
 24As Nozick puts it: “Actions that risk crossing another’s boundary pose serious prob-
lems for a natural-rights position ... Imposing how slight a probability of a harm that vio-
lates someone’s right also violates his rights? ... It is difficult to imagine a principled way 
in which the natural-rights tradition can draw the line to fix which probabilities impose 
unacceptably great risks upon others.” Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New 
York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 74-75. See especially: Peter Railton, “Locke, Stock, and 
Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk,” in Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays 
toward a Morality of Consequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 
7; Thomson, “Some Questions About Government Regulation of Behavior," in Rights, 
Restitution, and Risk, chap. 10; David McCarthy, “Rights, Explanation, and Risks,” 
Ethics 107 (1997): 205-25; Sven Ove Hansson, “Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance,” 
Erkenntnis 59 (2003); 291-309; Madeleine Hayenhjelm and Jonathan Wolff, “The Moral 
Problem of Risk Impositions: A Survey of the Literature,” European Journal of 
Philosophy 20, suppl. S1 (2012): E26-E51.  
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general paralysis. For there is absolutely nothing that I can do which does not carry some 
risk of harming others.25 
 
Perhaps risk, endemic to human social life, is devastating to traditional 
natural rights thinking if it cannot supply, in a principled way, norms 
demanding something other than bringing about/avoiding outcomes.26 In 
any case, we can say something of equal importance for offering the best 
theory of human rights.  
 A success condition for a theory of human rights is that it should 
show them to be practically meaningful for national and international 
policy. In particular, rights should provide guidance to practical reason 
about what is permissible by grounding duties. Understanding rights as 
requiring outcomes (e.g., preventing harm) undermines their ability to 
provide such guidance. Even in a deterministic universe, our epistemic 
relationship to the causally complex world rarely affords justified cer-
tainty in a particular outcome—and this, again, is exacerbated at the level 
of social policy. From the ex ante perspective of the agent, the relation-
ship between a decision and outcomes is probabilistic, and almost always 
involves probabilities other than zero and one. Rights theory has four 
options. One, it could forbid any action that has a probability greater than 
zero of harming a protected interest. As noted above, this would paralyze 
the agent. Two, it could permit any action that is not guaranteed to result 
in harm. This would render almost all activity, including extremely risky 
activity, permissible from the standpoint of rights. One would be barely 
capable of violating rights. Three, the morality of rights could prescind 
from saying anything about risk impositions—it could simply be a mo-
rality of outcomes. In this case, it offers little advice to the decision-
maker, as she normally decides on the basis of probabilities. Four, it of-
fers a principled account of acceptable risking to protected interests, 
where acceptability can fall between zero and one. Options one through 
three effectively have the result that either (nearly) all actions are per-
missible or (nearly) all actions are impermissible in terms of rights from 
the ex ante perspective of decision. Guidance could still be sought else-
where in morality, but in order to know whether any action or policy 
                                                        
 25Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 
88-89. We might think that intending to impose a risk, as opposed to merely foreseeing a 
risk imposition, is significant (ibid., p. 91). However, intention cannot fully address the 
problem for a rights-based theory, as can be gathered by considering high risk activities 
performed with innocent intentions. More generally, we do not want the force of rights to 
be wholly hostage to the structure of an agent’s plans. See Dennis McKerlie, “Rights and 
Risk,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986): 239-52, pp. 243-45. I discuss intention 
below. Even if intention is sometimes relevant, it does not resolve our basic difficulty, 
since we still need to know what counts as negligence with respect to the protected interest.  
 26McKerlie, “Rights and Risk,” pp. 245-51.  
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purportedly concerning human rights is permissible, we would have to 
rely almost exclusively upon heterogeneous moral concerns. Hence, we 
should not understand human rights’ duties in outcome-centric terms.  
 Call the following the practical inference test. Any nonskeptical    
account of human rights must show them to regularly assist inferences 
about what it is prospectively permissible to do. Interpreting human rights 
requirements in terms of determinate outcomes fails this test. Perhaps, 
though, it might be thought that I am moving too quickly, by ignoring the 
difference between knowing how to fulfill our duties and what, as a mor-
al question, our duties are. I have a duty not to kill innocents, but it is up 
to me (given my knowledge of human anatomy, basic facts about the 
world, and so on) to discern how to act pursuant to this requirement (by, 
for example, not firing a weapon into a crowd). A similar point might 
hold for human rights. Although an important distinction, it does not help 
the position rejected here. From the standpoint of decision, when we are 
discerning permissibility, requirements demanding certain outcomes 
cannot settle the permissible “how.” Again, any policy an agent adopts to 
avoid/achieve an outcome will have a probabilistic relationship to the 
outcome. We want to know whether the policy crosses the threshold of 
acceptable probability. Sometimes this will be intuitively clear, as in the 
crowd case. Sometimes it will be less clear, as when one hunts game in 
lightly populated areas. The agent needs to know in advance which is 
acceptable, even when the former could result in no injury, and the latter 
in a human fatality. What the agent needs, to select a policy, is a princi-
pled way of adjudicating probabilities. Merely mandating an outcome 
does not do this, thus failing the practical inference test.27 
 Return now to the torturer and the traffic accident. Almost all human 
                                                        
 27It still might be thought that I exaggerate. The right to life, construed as a right to an 
outcome, surely tells a gunman that it is wrong to fire into a crowd. However, strictly 
speaking, this is false. It tells him not to kill anyone in the crowd. Set aside (for now) 
intention, and imagine that he justifiably believes there is a 99% chance he will kill 
someone if he opens fire. He fires, and no one is harmed. He surely acted wrongly, but 
not with respect to an outcome right, since he did not bring about a forbidden outcome. 
Of course, the unlikely outcome was inaccessible to him, but that is precisely the point. 
From the perspective of an outcome right, the gunman knows that there is 99% chance 
that he will violate someone’s right if he shoots, but not that shooting violates someone’s 
right. An outcome right is a right to an outcome, simply, irrespective of the epistemic 
position of the agent. Consider a case in which the gunman is hunting in a designated 
area and does, while taking precaution, shoot someone. There he violates a purported 
outcome right, despite precaution. Strictly from the view of the outcome right, he acted 
less permissibly in this second case. Aside from being a counterintuitive moral result, it 
shows us how little is typically gathered ex ante about how to act responsibly from a 
strictly outcome right. Rights should permit us to straightforwardly say, ex ante, that the 
gunman would wrong the bystanders by opening fire. 
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rights theorists agree that we want to at least be able to hold political in-
stitutions accountable in terms of human rights. The examples illustrate 
the difficulty of relying on mere deprivation, treatment, or harm for iden-
tifying when institutions violate human rights. If a polity has a policy of 
torturing suspects, this is clear enough. Yet, the event of torture, in the 
presence of effective, active, and well-regulated legal institutions protect-
ing personal security, does not implicate a violation on the part of the 
polity. More generally, not all setbacks to interests deserving protection 
register as human rights violations. Again, the fatal traffic accident 
(which was avoidable—the polity could forbid motor vehicles) involves 
basic setbacks to human interests: death. Yet, we do not regard the harm 
as a rights violation on the part of political institutions. No one has been 
wronged, and no reparative response appears in order—a mundane ex-
ample, but it requires explanation, and others could be adduced: thefts, 
accidents, acts of God, and so on. The explanation, I suggest, is that we 
only treat unintentional harm as involving human rights violation when 
the injury is a function of an inadequate response to risk. When an agent 
ought to have foreseen and mitigated dangers to protected interests, but 
failed (in either respect) and harm is a consequence of this failure, we 
can then treat the injury as implicating a human rights violation. Call the 
demand that a theory of human rights should only hold institutions ac-
countable for wrongful injury (rather than injury generally), and should 
have some principled basis for distinguishing between wrongful and 
nonwrongful injuries, the institutional negligence test. 
 The combination of the practical inference test and the institutional 
negligence test yields the conclusion that the duty element of human 
rights must largely be framed in terms of probability rather than out-
comes. We should understand human rights duties in terms of a notion 
that is responsive to the epistemic situation of agents such that permissi-
bility in the circumstances of decision is at least partly illuminated. 
“Standard threats” appears promising.  
 
3.b. Illustrations and further defense 
 
1. Rights to fair trial and liberty of person. I am imprisoned, for a crime I 
did not commit. Assume that I have a human right to liberty of person 
and a public and fair tribunal for criminal charges. Are my human rights 
violated? Consider what the answer depends on. If I am convicted by an 
impartial jury of my peers, after a trial with appropriate procedural guar-
antees concerning evidence, self-incrimination, legal representation, and 
the like, then this suggests that, although my imprisonment is unfortunate 
(perhaps tragic), it is not wrongful with respect to human rights—
including the right to liberty of person. If, however, there are severe pro-
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cedural failings, the jury selection is biased, the judge is corrupt, the pre-
sumption of innocence is denied, or the judiciary is generally influenced 
by the executive, then it appears that my rights are indeed violated. The 
difference in the two types of scenario is not in the result produced, but 
in the manner in which the institutions induced it. Notice that each of the 
failings in the second scenario would increase the threat of a mistaken 
conviction, and as the foreseeable threat increases, we are more inclined 
to view a conviction as involving a human rights violation.28 The right to 
fair and public trial embodies, in this sense, a protection against standard 
threats to one’s liberty of person.29 Moreover, what counts as respecting 
the right to fair trial will largely be determined by what, in the social cir-
cumstances, mitigates risk of mistaken conviction. The content of the 
right to liberty of person is partly spelled out by the right to fair trial in 
view of standard threats to protected interests in liberty, and the content 
of the right to fair trial will be specified, in some concrete circumstance, 
by what can be expected to adequately reduce the danger of a mistaken 
outcome. For instance, if an impartial jury is unavailable here, then the 
trial must be moved, or jurors selected from, elsewhere. State agencies 
can prospectively respect the human rights to liberty of person and fair 
trial by adequately seeing to the salient risks. We must still indicate what 
“adequately seeing to the risks” fundamentally consists in, but a risk 
standard here exhibits the structure of a human rights-based concern with 
liberty. 
 
2. Right to free practice of religion. I have the justified fear that to pub-
licly manifest my religious convictions or practices would result in my 
harm. Is my right to freedom of religion being violated by my polity? 
Very likely, in view of the fact that the probable sources of such a fear 
are either the polity’s legal treatment of my religion, or the society’s in-
tolerance of it (or both). In the former case, even if a law prohibiting my 
religious practice is imperfectly enforced, the fact that it leaves my wel-
fare to the discretion of officials can be sufficient to leave my religious 
                                                        
 28The risk of acquitting the guilty is also pertinent to the protected security interests, 
for instance, of members of the community. What it means to respect human rights when 
there are multiple and potentially competing protected interests is an important matter. 
The appropriate standpoint for considering the issue is discussed in section 4. 
 29Nickel views due process rights largely in these terms. See Nickel, Making Sense of 
Human Rights, pp. 108-12. I am treating the right to fair trial as derivative, then, of the 
right to liberty of person. This is not to say that the right to fair trial is not of instrumental 
concern to other protected interests, or perhaps a basic way of protecting some interest 
(e.g., a dignity interest in being recognized by one’s political community). Here, for pur-
poses of illustration, I simply take up the right as it concerns liberty of person, leaving 
open the possibility of other derivations. 
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liberty objectionably vulnerable. Moreover, in such an environment, the 
fact that I display my religious practice on an occasion, and am not pun-
ished, does not imply that my right to religious freedom is not violated. 
My interest(s) in free religious practice remain threatened. On the other 
hand, if I fear society’s forceful rebuke, as discrimination, social ostra-
cism, or violence, then it suggests that the polity is inadequately policing 
discrimination, supporting a culture of tolerance, or providing security of 
person to religious minorities. Again, no harm may come of these threats, 
but they are predictable and not infrequent to human social life, and I do 
not enjoy religious liberty in their presence. These observations, if cor-
rect, suggest that if I justifiably fear—that is, correctly perceive—
substantial risk, then I have reason to doubt that my right to religious 
freedom is being respected. On the other hand, in a tolerant society, I 
may run afoul of a random zealot, and suffer a harm consequent of my 
express religious convictions. Perhaps the zealot violates my human 
right, but unless the society had reason to be sensitive to the special dan-
ger, it is not, it seems, implicated. Again, the central upshot is that the 
human right to free religious practice appears largely concerned with 
controlling risks to the relevant dignity interests, rather than avoiding 
setbacks per se. 
 
3. Respect, protect, provide. One might accept the above and still object 
that human rights do more than protect against risks. Sometimes they 
protect against intentional outcomes, and simply forbid agencies from 
directly instantiating an event. For instance, human rights simply forbid 
the executive from imprisoning opponents for political reasons, engaging 
in torture, punishing innocuous religious expression, or depriving access 
to clean water. Imprisoning political opponents without due process is 
primarily wrongful, it might be thought, in its unjustified restriction of 
liberty, not its risk imposition. Moreover, rights to outcomes are prospec-
tively action-guiding in the sense that they tell us that it is impermissible 
to intentionally cause a forbidden outcome. To put this in terms of the 
widely accepted respect/protect/provide framework for human rights du-
ties, my analysis appears to address the “protect” and “provide” require-
ments, but largely neglects the “respect” requirement. To respect some-
one’s human right against torture, I simply ought not torture the person.30  
 Despite varying formulations of the tripartite framework in the litera-
ture, those employing it roughly agree that human rights impose duties 
to: (1) respect rights, that is, avoid harming, or introducing deprivation of 
concern to, protected interests, (2) protect rights, that is, adequately ensure 
                                                        
 30I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing these points, especially in 
these terms. 
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that others respect rights, and (3) provide, that is, aid those whose pro-
tected interests are experiencing remediable setbacks.31 It is worth noting 
that Shue did not intend the framework as an alternative to a standard 
threats approach.  
 
If a right provides the rational basis for a justified demand that the actual enjoyment of 
the substance of the right be socially guaranteed against standard threats, then a right 
provides the rational basis for insisting upon the performance, as needed, of duties to 
avoid, duties to protect, and duties to aid.32  
 
We should agree with Shue that the framework, insofar as it is illuminat-
ing, ought largely to be treated as subsidiary to the standard threats ap-
proach to specifying human rights duties. For one, it delivers a unifying 
idea that potentially explains the relevance of these three types of duties 
to human rights. All three types of action are necessary to avoid impos-
ing risks. Second, treating protection against risk as the underlying idea 
helps supply determinacy in specific contexts to each type of duty. In the 
illustrations above, this is perhaps clearest where protection and provi-
sion are at issue. However, consider Shue’s formulation of the avoidance 
duty (i.e., respect) as it pertains to subsistence rights: “a duty simply not 
to take actions that deprive others of a means that, but for one’s harmful 
actions, would have satisfied their subsistence rights or enabled them to 
satisfy their own subsistence rights.”33 For actions that have a probability 
other than 1 or 0 of producing an unintended but foreseeable deprivation, 
knowing in advance whether the actions respect the potentially deprived 
requires a standard articulating the degree of permissible risking. After-
wards, to determine whether a resulting deprivation is wrongful (rather 
than merely regrettable), we again will require a sense of whether the 
action crossed a threshold of permissible riskiness. Otherwise, if we read 
Shue’s formulation literally, all human acts that deprive protected inter-
ests are human rights violations. This is implausible, as the car accident 
example shows. Otherwise said, the earlier arguments concerning the 
propriety of standard threats apply to the duty to avoid harming, at least 
in cases of noncertain, unintended, and foreseeable harming. It is also 
worth emphasizing that even in cases of certain harm or deprivation (i.e., 
where probability of harm is 1), we can, consistent with a model of 
wrongs as risk impositions, treat the action simply as dramatically falling 
below the threshold of permissible risking, and thus as wrong in that  
                                                        
 31Shue introduced the framework. See Shue, Basic Rights, pp. 51-64. It is, however, 
very widely used. See, for instance, Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice, pp. 36-38. 
 32Shue, Basic Rights, pp. 54-55. 
 33Ibid., p.55. 
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respect.34 If respect for human dignity requires that I not impose moder-
ate risk of deprivation, for instance, then it is abundantly disrespectful to 
generate a probability of 1 of that deprivation. 
 Intentional harms might be different. If an official tortures a prisoner, 
it is not only the high probability of inducing suffering that seems to con-
cern us. In fact, torture by its very nature seems to be an intentional act, 
and it is plausibly as bad as or worse than merely producing qualitatively 
similar suffering as a side effect of one’s activity. Similar points hold for 
express prohibitions on religious practice and the imprisonment of politi-
cal opponents. I do not deny that intention can be a wrong-making feature 
of an action, independent of negligence, and that it can be so in the morali-
ty of human rights. Indeed, intention is capable of performing the two 
tasks just mentioned. An act can prospectively be deemed wrongful by the 
character of its operative intention, and consequences can be held to be a 
feature of the act by examining the scope of the intention. If a harm is 
intended (as a means or end), then it can be sorted out as wrongful from 
the total array of injuries. Hence, I agree, rights to outcomes can meaning-
fully prohibit intentional activity. Nonetheless, granting that there is a sep-
arate species of human rights wronging does not undermine the thesis 
here that human rights violations largely consist in agential failures regard-
ing standard threats. Much of what human rights are thought to require, 
as we can see in the illustrations above, is only sensible in view of a risk-
based standard of conduct. Moreover, in some cases where we may be 
inclined to impute part of the wrongfulness to intention, there remains a 
role for risk imposition. A legislature targets certain religious practices, 
and its overbroad prohibition endangers others by giving wide scope to 
the effective discretion of officials. Further, it signals a willingness on the 
part of the governing body to restrict religion when expedient or popular. 
Here we need a risk standard to capture the full extent of the wrong. Final-
ly, in an important sense, protecting against standard threats is the primary, 
if not always immediate, mandate for political institutions. When an ex-
ecutive agency intends to torture and successfully does so, members have 
failed in their immediate capacity as state officials to avoid forming and 
acting on the intention. Yet, a prior question concerns the institutional 
context that enabled the agency to successfully carry out the act. If insti-
tutional mechanisms are not in place to incapacitate such intentions, then 
we have evidence that dignity interests were objectionably vulnerable 
prior to the torture. The executive agency ought not to have been in a 
position to deliver on its objectives, and the broader institutions failed to 
enact appropriate safeguards (including an institutional culture discour-
                                                        
 34This point is along the lines of McCarthy’s defense of the “Risk Thesis”: McCarthy, 
“Rights, Explanation, and Risks,” p. 224. 
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aging serious consideration of such objectives). The human right against 
torture primarily tasks a body of political institutions with ensuring that 
those who fall within its jurisdiction do not face the threat of torture.  
  
3.c. Agential failure regarding standard threats as risk imposition 
 
What is the character of agential failure identified by a norm requiring 
protection of an interest against standard threats? Agencies fail when 
they do not properly mitigate foreseeable and common threats posed by 
the world and social life to human dignity. What counts, though, as ade-
quate mitigation? What counts as foreseeable? A lending agency and/or 
national government perceives that a significant increase in water prices 
could be a function of its policy. How much of a danger to basic human 
interests must this pose for it to constitute a human rights violation? Pri-
vatization results in inaccessibly priced clean water (though perhaps 
prices would have risen anyway). Is the result foreseeable in a way that 
invites a reparative response in virtue of a rights violation?  
 These are pressing questions here, and the inability to provide a prin-
cipled response would leave the standard threats approach no better off, 
in terms of the just defended criteria, than an outcome-centric approach. 
Given that we have a social practice that addresses these sorts of issues 
in a reasonably systematic way, the law of torts, I have some confidence 
that a principled approach is available. However, we should first note 
some preliminary consequences of the standard threats interpretation, 
and make clear the proper way to analyze “standard threats.”  
 If human rights protect against standard threats, then the fact of a pro-
tected interest’s setback (hereafter “injury”) is only evidence of a human 
rights violation, it does not constitute one. A death (e.g.) could be the re-
sult of a nonstandard threat, or a properly mitigated standard one, and even 
if it ought to have been averted, the rights violation consists in the inade-
quate response to the danger (or its creation), not the death. (The injury is 
still morally important, from the standpoint of human rights, but largely 
from the point of view of corrective justice.) Moreover, failing to protect 
against a threat may not result in an injury. In a region prone to earth-
quakes, a government fails to establish an effective regulatory agency to 
ensure safe building construction. An earthquake strikes, but miraculously, 
no one is injured. The good fortune of all does not imply that the gov-
ernment acted responsibly. Rather, in adopting the discourse of standard 
threats, we should say that it did violate its people’s human rights—
though it is not (given the lucky circumstance) in a position to repair in-
juries that are a function of its failure (as there are none).35 My human 
                                                        
 35Though risk imposition, by itself, can invite liability for repair. See David McCarthy, 
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rights are violated when an agency inadequately responds to danger to 
my protected interests.  
 Intuitively, to say “protect against standard threats” would appear to 
indicate that: we should protect against events that are foreseeably fre-
quent, and significantly injurious to human dignity. Moreover, it would 
surely be granted that as the potential impact to protected interests in-
creases, then the threshold of probability for the threat to count as 
“standard” decreases (as in the earthquake case). On the other end, high 
probability for relatively low impact threats may permit them to qualify 
(e.g., regular low-level corruption in bureaucratic agencies). This is just 
to think in terms of risk, understood as probability of an injury multiplied 
by its seriousness (though, to capture the various prospects of any policy, 
we would express risk as a schedule or profile of possible outcomes). On 
this view, human rights normally protect against significant risks to our 
dignity. This is different from saying that there is a separate human right 
against risk imposition in addition to human rights against harms.36 It is 
not that there are a set of human rights against harming, and others 
against risking. Again, human rights protect against risks in the first 
place, rather than harm per se. 
 The idea of risk is not itself unproblematic, and we need to say more 
about the relevant sense—particularly the element of probability—to 
forestall certain misunderstandings and objections, and to set the stage 
for a proper formulation of the risk standard. At minimum, human rights 
are in the business of assigning obligations to institutional agents to re-
spect and protect human dignity, and these obligations ought to be such 
that the agent can be held accountable in view of them. Consequently, if 
risk mitigation is basic to the duties of human rights, a theory of human 
rights needs an understanding of probability that: (1) is responsive to 
agential capacity, (2) renders risk intersubjectively cognizable, and (3) 
can implicate moral concern. To partly follow Stephen Perry’s treatment 
of risk for the purposes of tort theory,37 I suggest that we understand 
probability in frequentist and moderately epistemic terms, that is, as in-
volving judgments of objective relative frequency based upon evidence 
available to the subject, but properly assessed according to intersubjec-
                                                                                                                            
“Liability and Risk,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 238-62. 
 36Hannson and Oberdiek, e.g., appear to treat the right against risking they defend in 
this way. See Hansson, “Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance,” and John Oberdiek, 
“Towards a Right against Risking,” Law and Philosophy 28 (2009): 367-92.  
 37See Stephen R. Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” in David G. Owen (ed.), 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
chap. 14, and “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” in Gerald J. 
Postema (ed.), Philosophy and the Law of Torts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), chap. 3.  
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tively valid standards of reasoning.  
 On this understanding, probability judgments concern the frequency 
of an attribute relative to a class, where estimating the probability of a 
particular event involves treating it as a member of a class. I judge that 
there is a .167 chance that the die will show “2,” which is to say that I 
judge that 1 in 6 “rolled, six-sided fair dice” has the property of coming 
up 2, and that the die is a member of that class. Objective probability is 
the actual relative frequency of an attribute to a class. Subjective proba-
bility is the proper estimation of objective relative frequency given a sub-
ject’s available evidence and the proper deployment of applicable stand-
ards of inference. Perry explains: 
 
The most satisfactory account of epistemic probability maintains that such probabilities 
involve estimations of relative frequency that have been made, relative to a given body of 
evidence, in accordance with accepted standards of inductive reasoning and rational be-
lief. If such standards can properly be regarded as intersubjectively valid, then there is a 
sense in which epistemic probability judgments can be said to be objective.38 
 
Proper estimations of probability, then, will reflect the degree of well-
conducted inquiry we can expect. My judgment that there is a .25 chance 
of rain in the next hour is assessed on the basis of the evidence available 
to me, and how well I used the evidence inferentially. Information gath-
ering and reasoning require effort, thus we must also index our standards 
of correct estimation against some level of (normatively determined) 
well-conducted investigation. Appropriate estimation depends not only 
on what counts as treating the evidence with epistemic propriety, but also 
on the degree to which we can expect the agent to deploy information-
gathering techniques and inferential tools.  
 Risk, on this approach, amounts to epistemic probability of injury 
multiplied by the degree of injury. We should treat epistemic, as opposed 
to objective, risk as the relevant sense for human rights protection, since 
we want human rights to partially illuminate the realm of permissible 
policies for agencies. If an agent’s duty were to protect against objective 
risk, the permissibility of nearly any policy would be (almost in princi-
ple) inaccessible. Our knowledge of relative frequencies is standardly 
imperfect. Yet, we have not given up on objective duties or accountabil-
ity either—assessment of risk is still based in intersubjectively valid epis-
temic and logical standards. We can expect a certain estimation of risk 
given an agent’s capacities, available evidence, and reasonable degree of 
inquiry. Irrespective of whether the agent in fact foresees a threat, we can 
determine whether a kind of threat is reasonably foreseeable.39 Finally, 
                                                        
 38Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” pp. 97-98. 
 39Thus, a firm or official agency, e.g., is not relieved of responsibility for proper risk 
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the moderate epistemic conception of probability maintains a basic tie to 
the way the world is and how things turn out—ultimately, we are trying 
to discern factual relative frequencies. 40  Risk properly engenders our 
moral concern when it speaks to how our action will actually affect oth-
ers’ interests. We cannot explicate human rights duties simply in terms of 
outcomes. Nonetheless, our motivation to spell out the content of such 
duties in terms of risk is still grounded in a moral concern with how our 
action will impact the availability of human dignity. 
 To risk, then, is to make it epistemically correct to re-classify at least 
one (protected) interest as a member of a class of such interests with a 
higher relative frequency of injury. Though helpful, an important ambi-
guity arises as soon as we begin to employ risk normatively—one typi-
cally ignored by ethicists in their treatment of risk.41 What is the initial 
class, with its accompanying rate of injury, with which it is appropriate 
to understand the interest? What is the baseline to which we rightly com-
pare the risk creation? There are two issues. One concerns the joint-ness 
of social risk, the other how to characterize the degree of background 
risk that appropriately accompanies human existence. I bike in a bike 
lane, and a texting driver speeds by. We are tempted to say that the driver 
imposed a risk, but this presupposes that we properly single out the driv-
er as the risk imposer, and that the risk creation is significant enough to 
warrant our concern. Why not say that I imposed the risk by bike-riding, 
or that the risk involved in our interaction is of the same innocuous char-
acter as my interaction with the pedestrian, tree, or tricycle-riding toddler 
to my right? Risks are standardly a function of multiple parties,42 and 
                                                                                                                            
responsiveness by ignorance. Its ignorance would have to be consistent with what it 
ought to have believed given the appropriate degree of well-conducted inquiry in the 
circumstances.  
 40In contrast to more radical subjectivist conceptions of probability where the connec-
tion between the world and a subject’s justified confidence in a proposition (i.e., confi-
dence that does not violate the probability calculus or other constraints) is attenuated. 
See: Roy Weatherford, Philosophical Foundations of Probability Theory (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 219-42; and Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsi-
bility,” pp. 325-29. I am not quite entering debates about the best theory of probability, 
qua theory of probability. Rather, I am indicating the sense of probability relevant to 
human rights morality. 
 41One example is McCarthy, “Rights, Explanation, and Risks.” One exception is 
Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” pp. 108-15. 
 42As an anonymous reviewer points out, the problem of joint-ness is not unique to 
risk imposition. After all, in the event of a crash, any harm befalling the biker is caused 
by both parties. Acceptable background risk is the special and pressing issue confronting 
risk imposition (and it is the matter that receives attention in what follows). Nonetheless, 
recognizing joint-ness is typically crucial in rendering determinate risk imposition: with-
out a baseline of coordinated behavior or expectation, we are frequently not in a position 
to identify the risk imposer.  
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anyhow, risk is an inevitable feature of life (social or not). We tell the 
texting driver that texting put others at risk, and there is a clear sense in 
which the statement is true.43 However, if we intend the statement to oper-
ate normatively, we require a normative response to: compared to what? 
 To answer the question, we must appeal both to recognized standards 
of conduct in a social environment and a level of background risk appro-
priate to the environment given general characteristics of the context. 
Consider what permits the standard of care in negligence law to offer a 
meaningful and effective basis for regulating risk. In conjunction with 
other legal standards and social convention, it coordinates expectation in 
the interactive environment: cars to center of the roadway, bikes to the 
perimeter; tennis at parks, trucks on the road. Moreover, aside from co-
ordinating behavior, the standard of care establishes a legally acceptable 
degree of risk that one can introduce into an interactive environment. 
Requirements not to drive while distracted or operate an undermain-
tained vehicle serve to reduce the overall quantity of risk. Duties of care 
do not typically eliminate risk. Rather, they (at least implicitly) supply a 
standard of appropriate background risk for an interactive environment 
of a certain type. When I drive carefully, I generate risks, but not unac-
ceptably (so far as the law goes). When one fails with respect to a duty of 
care (e.g., by driving while distracted), tort law can (despite risk’s perva-
siveness) indicate the failure as the risk imposer by referring to a stand-
ard of appropriate background risk.  
 In moving the conceptual apparatus outside the context of negligence 
law, I will not be concerned with anyone’s actual views about acceptable 
background risks. This would be insufficiently normative from the point 
of view of human rights.44 We must supply a moral standard for accepta-
ble background risk. Nonetheless, the analysis models how to supply 
determinacy to “risk imposition.” Risk imposition refers to the elevation 
of risk to at least one protected interest above the acceptable rate in the 
context of interaction. I impose a risk by making it appropriate to de-
scribe a protected interest as a member of a class with a higher relative 
frequency of at least one kind of injury than is acceptable (a normative 
criterion requiring explication). The model provides a method for sin-
gling out wrongdoers and a comparison point (or baseline) for what con-
stitutes wrongdoing. To treat human rights as protections against stand-
ard threats is to understand the relevant wrongdoing as risk imposition: 
                                                        
 43Compared to similar circumstances without a texting driver, the expected losses are 
higher. 
 44It would, I think, be insufficiently normative from the view of a well-functioning 
system of tort law. See Anthony R. Reeves, “Foreseeability and Strict Liability in Torts: 
A Moral Analysis of Liability for Environmental Injury,” unpublished ms.  
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an agent fails by failing to keep risk to dignity interests at acceptable 
background levels. The moral challenge is now clear. Given some social 
environment, what counts as an acceptable level of background risk to 
human dignity? 
 
 
4. Risk and the Standpoint of Protected Interests 
 
4.a. An approach to defining acceptable risk 
 
From the point of view of human rights, imposing a risk is standardly the 
wrong-making feature of a decision or policy. However, does my interest 
in bodily integrity require that I have only a .001 chance of injury of a 
certain type, or .005, .01, .02, .05, .1, .15, .25, .33 …? These are dramati-
cally different duties, and though we should not expect absolute preci-
sion from our moral political concepts, we should expect some determi-
nate guidance on how to approach the question from a successful institu-
tional morality. Again, if the argument of section 3 is successful, we 
cannot avoid the issue. We typically need a standard of acceptable back-
ground risk to dignity interests to know what it would mean to wrong 
another with respect to her human rights.  
 Moreover, simply referring to other normative elements of a human 
right (protected interest, duty, duty-bearer) is unhelpful here. If we estab-
lish, for example, that “normative agency” has a moral significance in 
human dignity that could (in principle) ground weighty duties in another, 
that does not tell us the degree of threat to be mitigated. Of course, the 
moral importance of the interest will certainly be relevant to how much 
protection is required, but we need a principled way of incorporating that 
importance into a risk-responsive standard of care required of others. 
Existing theories of human rights do not provide such guidance. Addi-
tionally, knowing that certain agencies are duty-bearers is likely im-
portant to setting a baseline, but does not itself tell us what they are re-
sponsible for. A range of policies will be feasible and available to the 
agent (with accompanying trade-offs): which set of policies is rendered 
nondiscretionary by virtue of epistemic risk to my interests? Finally, it 
seems clear that conceptual analysis of “duty” will not, by itself, move us 
forward. We must introduce additional normative considerations. 
 Nonetheless, we should not introduce moral considerations ad hoc. If 
we appealed to virtues of fairness, reasonableness, or efficiency, for in-
stance, we would rightly wonder why that sort of consideration ought to 
enter here, at the level of settling the appropriate degree of risk mitiga-
tion for protected interests. Moral appeals here should be driven by con-
cerns that move us to adopt the perspective of human rights. I suggest, 
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then, that we operate from the standpoint of the interests protected by our 
moral concern with human dignity. We have assumed, given the afore-
mentioned division of labor in normative theorizing about human rights 
(section 2), that these interests engender obligatory concern: that is what 
it means to call them “protected.” The standpoint of these interests, then, 
is a morally important point of view—which is to say that we have rea-
son to satisfy (or make available to the subject the satisfaction of) these 
interests. What, from the point of view of these interests, is an acceptable 
amount of risk in the context of choice? 
 Of course, in an ideal world, the answer is: none. Why, from the per-
spective of an interest, would any risk be regarded as acceptable? Our 
dangerous world requires compromises at two levels. First, insofar as 
human dignity protects distinct interests (e.g., in education, nutrition, or 
bodily integrity), and they cannot all be protected maximally, some pro-
file of prioritization has to be given. The contours of this profile could be 
quite complex, with differing trade-off rates at different levels of satis-
faction and protection. This is a matter for the theory of human dignity, 
so set it aside. Second, there are multiple bearers of protected interests, 
and no one’s basic human dignity counts for more than another’s. This is 
not quite to state a substantive principle of equality: it is simply to note 
that the dignity of each is entitled to consideration, and none more than 
any other. An agent responsible for human rights must regard the dignity 
of each person, within the proper scope of her concern, impartially. 
 I offer an approach, and then detail its justification. Hereafter, “sub-
ject” refers to someone who has human rights, and thus possesses the 
constellation of interests protected by human dignity. “Agency” refers to 
an agent who bears duties of human rights. To settle on a baseline of ac-
ceptable risk, we ask what profile of risk would be regarded as accepta-
ble to each actual subject given the following constraints: 
 
(1) Each is restricted to relying upon a generic description of the circum-
stances. The description only includes facts relevant to protected in-
terests and epistemically accessible to the agency.  
(2) Each reasons only on the basis of her protected interests. 
(3) Each is unaware of which actual social position she occupies. 
 
We are then answering the question: when can we regard the subject as 
properly satisfied with the agency’s responsiveness to her interests given 
the actual circumstances and the presence of other, equally compelling, 
moral demands? Constraint (1) models the idea that epistemic risk, from 
the vantage point of the agency, is the relevant sense of risk for human 
rights. I argued for this idea in section 3. Since the relevant sense of risk 
is epistemic, we ask the subject to occupy the agency’s epistemic posi-
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tion for the purposes of estimating the risk profiles of various policies. 
That position is defined by the degree of well-conducted inquiry rightly 
expected of the agency, not any actual inquiry undergone by the agen-
cy—that is, an agency’s factually poor risk estimations will not define 
the risk profiles for idealized consideration by subjects. In taking up the 
agency’s standpoint, moreover, we (at least implicitly) incorporate con-
siderations of institutional competence. To take up its position is to 
acknowledge its capacities. Finally, the constraint centers our attention 
on aspects of the context salient to the protection of dignity interests. We 
omit other matters, and consider only facts relevant to protected interests, 
because the moral concern of human rights is dignity.  
 Constraint (2) further models this exclusive concern. Since we are 
solely interested in the subject’s dignity interests, we can abstract from 
other interests, aims, and desires. This is not to say that there could not 
be other concerns of political morality; it is simply to say that, if there 
are, they are not part of the morality of human rights, and thus ought not 
figure into its standards of right conduct. 
 Constraint (3) models the impartiality of human rights. An agency 
owes equal concern to each person’s dignity, so the fact that a nameable 
subject is a certain person (as opposed to some other subject) is of no 
consequence. That person is owed consideration—precisely the same as 
every other subject. Hence, we should not ask: which profile of risk 
would be acceptable to a person aware of which subject she is? That 
would permit her to give weight to a fact (i.e., that she is this particular 
person) that is irrelevant from the vantage point of human rights. Instead, 
we consider what would be an acceptable risk profile to each subject 
aware of the various actual social positions, but unaware of which posi-
tion she will occupy. Put otherwise, an agency must adopt a scheme of 
policy that keeps risk at a level that would be acceptable to any natural 
person of the agency (from the point of view of her dignity interests) 
knowing she will occupy some actual, but unknown, subject’s position. 
Otherwise, it violates at least one subject’s human rights by virtue of risk 
imposition. 
 The above frame, being a contractualist device, resembles Rawls’s 
hypothetical decision procedure at the legislative stage, but with several 
basic differences.45 One is that the hypothetical frame is motivated by the 
moral point of view of human rights, not (necessarily) by the idea of a 
fair system of social cooperation. Another is that the decision is made 
directly in terms of acceptable risks to protected interests. A third is that 
we do not operate under the assumption that we are specifying principles 
                                                        
 45John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1999), pp. 171-76. 
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for a well-ordered society. Nonetheless, the function of hypothetical ac-
ceptability here is to restrict the use of facts as reasons for decision. In 
adopting the standpoint, we can only rely upon the relevant considera-
tions for the domain in question. In determining what would be rationally 
acceptable for some question under the constraints, we effectively articu-
late what the relevant reasons recommend.46 We ignore what would be 
acceptable outside of the frame for the purposes of settling a normative 
standard, since it could reflect responsiveness to irrelevant facts.  
 For purposes of clarity, I summarize the argument. We noticed that 
human rights standards must largely be understood in terms of acceptable 
risk, and then asked how, from the point of view of human rights, we 
could arrive at a standard given the pervasiveness of risk and multiplicity 
of demands. To mimic Kagan’s worry, for any given injury of concern to 
human rights, how do we nonarbitrarily determine if a probability of oc-
currence (between zero and one) is problematic? An ad hoc appeal to 
heterogeneous moral principles to solve the problem is unlikely to elimi-
nate our sense of arbitrariness. The theory of human dignity tells us that 
certain interests mandate strong moral concern on the part of agencies. 
So, we adopt the perspective of the protected interests, as cognizable 
from the epistemic vantage point of the agency, and consider what would 
be satisfactory to persons deciding from the standpoint of those interests 
alone. Yet, this concern is impartial, in the sense that no one’s dignity 
deserves greater consideration than anyone else’s. We model this impar-
tiality by asking: what profile of risk would be acceptable to each, from 
the point of view of protected interests, while ignorant of which actually 
existing social location he will occupy? Whatever the answer for a con-
text, we have a determinate method—a principled way of approaching 
the problem of acceptable background risk—for the various normative 
purposes to which we wish to put human rights discourse. In other 
words, although we have a standard whose requirements are sometimes 
difficult to discern, especially in the real world of political decision, our 
judgment has a target. We have something to discern. 
 
4.b. The context-dependence of the risk standard 
 
The idea that appropriate risk responsiveness is context-dependent is fa-
miliar. Compare our understanding of safe driving in circumstances of a 
clear, dry, sunny day, with light traffic and a straight road to that of driving 
at night, with thick fog, icy and windy roads, and heavy traffic. Which 
                                                        
 46This seems in line with Rawls’s view of the original position: see ibid., pp. 15-19, 
and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), pp. 14-18, 80-94. 
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actions are precautionary differs between the circumstances, and the de-
gree to which we expect agents to mitigate risk also differs: the latter 
context will have a higher rate of acceptable risk. Although we rightly 
expect slower and more alert driving on icy roads, even the careful driver 
poses a greater threat to other roadway users compared to a situation with 
dry roads. Our intuitions here are partly shaped by the driver’s capacity 
to mitigate risk given objective features of the circumstance. 
 Given that proper risk responsiveness is context-sensitive, we will, 
when considering acceptable risk, need to relativize the inquiry to the 
context of the subjects and agency. Human rights discourse ought to 
function outside ideal situations, so we will need to contextualize its 
claims to real-world circumstances. What would be acceptable risk (as 
defined above) given the general features of the subjects’ and agency’s 
context? Relevant contextual features for the description include: climate, 
geographical characteristics, presence of natural resources, the capacity 
and development of social and political institutions, available technology 
and feasible technological advances, culture and traditions, operative 
social conventions, political sociology, and any other general and epi-
stemically accessible features that should be expected to have an impact 
on protected interests.  
 This is neither conservative (in the sense of treating the status quo as 
presumptively legitimate) nor undemanding, and it captures our sense 
that the requirements of human rights vary by context. A human right to 
education should not be understood to require a developing country to 
provide general access to quality post-secondary education (though it 
could have a duty to begin developing these institutions). However, it is 
straightforward to suggest that states with advanced, skill-intensive 
economies do have such an obligation—lack of access compromises 
one’s ability to participate in the economy and hence adequately satisfy 
various protected interests. Taking another example, an agency in a re-
gion prone to tropical disease can only be expected to respond according 
to the state of scientific understanding and medical technology, but it 
must respond in earnest to mitigate the risk—developing infrastructure 
and regulatory regimes that can be expected to reduce the risk of infec-
tion to an acceptable level, as well as investing in research. To settle the 
appropriate baseline, we would need much more information (as seems 
right) about the circumstances to determine what would be impartially 
acceptable in them, including information about the agency in question. 
Yet we have, in principle, a meaningful basis for saying what does and 
does not count as a human rights violation.  
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4.c. Discursive functionality and impartial acceptability 
 
We might ask: Why focus on what constitutes a “violation” of human 
rights? Perhaps human rights discourse is valuable simply insofar as it 
effectively directs our attention to serious human-caused deprivation or 
harm. One response is that the standard of right conduct is essential to 
nonarbitrarily determining what harms ought to register in our moral con-
sciousness. Another response is that it is attractive to see human rights as 
offering benchmarks for recognitional legitimacy, just war, the extent of 
sovereign immunity, justified intervention of various kinds, the adequacy 
of institutional responses to poverty, when reparative obligations are 
owed, and the like. To offer a benchmark is to tell us when an agency is 
failing—when it is acting irresponsibly or wrongly with respect to sub-
jects’ human rights. Different levels of departure from the standard may 
implicate different moral responses (e.g., official condemnation vs. inter-
vention), but having a determinate sense of what counts as departure is 
essential for the idea to give us a grip on the kind of issues just noted. 
Slightly differently, the understanding of human rights suggested here, as 
protections against risk impositions to dignity interests, maintains a dis-
cursive functionality in the absence of consensus regarding foundational 
matters in normative ethics. We need a determinate sense of what counts 
as a human rights violation (i.e., a wrong) if we wish to attach normative 
consequences to its occurrence or nonoccurrence. Impartial consideration 
of protected interests supplies the prospect of this without demanding 
contractualism or consequentialism (e.g.) to the core. It merely requires 
assent to a moral view of human dignity.   
 The analogy with tort law is again helpful. However we interpret the 
duties of care in tort,47 we understand them to set the standard for what 
counts as wrongful risk imposition. When I impose a risk (e.g., by driv-
ing carelessly), it has certain normative consequences—most notably, it 
renders me liable for foreseeable injuries that are within the risk. If I 
abide by my duties of care, I remain largely immune from reparative le-
gal obligations for the harmful effects of my actions. Here “care,” 
“wrong,” “liability,” and “repair” have determinate, interrelated norma-
tive roles—and valuables ones in that, along with other legal standards, 
they give us an operational normative system regulating what we owe 
                                                        
 47There are two prominent moral interpretations of the duty of care in tort law. A 
“cost/benefit approach” treats it as an efficient allocation of responsibility given the ag-
gregate of legally recognized interests. For a recent defense, see Barbara H. Fried, “The 
Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts,” Legal Theory 18 (2012): 231-62. A 
“fairness-based approach” treats it as embodying reciprocity among persons. For a classic 
statement, see George Fletcher, “Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,” Harvard Law 
Review 85 (1972): 537-73.  
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each other in large domains of interpersonal conduct. Similarly, human 
rights concepts can perform their, perhaps quite different, requisite func-
tions for international morality, even if we understand the underlying 
obligation (as in tort law) in terms of imposing risk. To put it roughly, we 
might think of agencies as having a certain normal moral (and sometimes 
legally recognized) status in the international political order when they 
comply with human rights: they can participate in various forums, enjoy 
immunities, enter certain agreements, and so on. When an agency fails in 
terms of standard threats to protected interests, its normative status 
changes (how so depending on the severity or character of the viola-
tion(s)): it may now (to take some examples) be liable to condemnation, 
exclusion from certain forums, intervention of various kinds, or interna-
tional prosecution. Again, the idea of risk imposition enables human 
rights to serve as a meaningful discourse of international morality. 
 One might doubt that I have provided enough determinacy for the 
above task. To settle on a baseline for acceptable risk, I ask: what would 
be impartially acceptable to subjects, from the standpoint of their pro-
tected interests, given a generic description of the context? Given the 
context-dependence of the answer, it is difficult to say much more in ad-
vance of considering any particular human rights claim, and evaluating 
any claim still requires careful judgment. Yet, one may think, I have not 
sufficiently indicated what “acceptability” amounts to in principle, leav-
ing such judgment unguided. Are we simply looking for maximum ex-
pected value in terms of protected interests (i.e., optimal protection of 
dignity in aggregate)? Or, must we be, independent of expected value 
overall, sensitive to distribution of risk (i.e., does “acceptability” con-
strain risks that a person can bear)? Which of these or other alternatives 
is acceptable from the point of view of the hypothetical frame? 
 I can say several things. First, I can admit the objection’s point and 
still emphasize the gains made here (insofar as the arguments are suc-
cessful) in determinacy and human rights theorizing. We know what hu-
man rights standards must typically answer to: acceptable risk in the hy-
pothetical frame. A successful argument regarding compliance or non-
compliance with human rights must plausibly address the constraints of 
the frame, and supply a plausible answer to the question it poses. Second, 
Barbara Fried forcefully argues that it is unclear that contractualism and 
consequentialism offer markedly different advice for most regulatory 
contexts, where we are operating from the ex ante perspective of risk and 
have well-defined and properly weighted interests.48  This models the 
standpoint of the hypothetical frame once a theory of dignity is in hand. 
                                                        
 48Barbara H. Fried, “Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?” Journal of 
Ethics 16 (2012): 39-66. 
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So, for two plausible approaches to addressing the frame’s question, we 
should not assume substantially different responses. After all, tort law 
gets along well enough despite disagreement about the justification and 
interpretation of its standard of care, suggesting a reasonable amount of 
convergence on acceptable risk. 49  Substantiating the point rigorously 
would require engaging with general discussions of the nature and desir-
ability of contractualist constraints on risking.50 I cannot do this here. 
However, I can sketch the motivations and character of two salient re-
sponses to the hypothetical frame. Doing this will, I hope, blunt the sense 
that we have not made gains in determinacy, and illustrate the nature of 
remaining indeterminacy. 
 Take two candidate standards for acceptable risk. “Efficiency” de-
fines acceptable risk as that with the highest expected value in the aggre-
gate (considering exclusively the properly weighted dignity interests of 
all relevant persons in the context). “Equity” departs from efficiency by 
constraining the distribution of risk among persons according to some 
standard(s) of equality, optimizing expected dignity value within those 
constraints. It might be thought that articulating the level of proper back-
ground risk in terms of acceptability to each qualified standpoint rules 
out efficiency. After all, each person’s dignity counts equally, and we 
understood this to require a unanimity that effectively imposes a veil of 
ignorance. Unaware of which actual social position I could occupy, 
should I not reject any solution that would permit unequal protection of 
my interests? Or, I permit inequality only on the condition of improve-
ments for the riskiest position. The interests in question are of basic sig-
nificance, so it might seem appropriate to choose the policy scheme with 
the least bad risk profile—it is a rational response to the kinds of inter-
                                                        
 49We might wonder whether tort lawyers share a principled basis for determining 
reasonable care, especially given that in difficult cases the question is left to juries. Per-
haps there is no thoroughgoing consensus, but even juries will be attempting to discern 
what counts as adequate precaution in such cases, and their judgment (in virtue of this) 
will be constrained to some range of answers.  
 50I think it is safe to say that, currently, it is not entirely clear what, precisely, 
contractualist constraints amount to from the ex ante perspective. For various discussions, 
see: Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1998), pp. 202-41; Sophia Reibetanz, “Contractualism and Aggregation,” 
Ethics 108 (1998): 296-11; Rahul Kumar, “Defending the Moral Moderate: Contrac-
tualism and Common Sense,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28 (1999): 275-309; Elizabeth 
Ashford, “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism,” Ethics 113 (2003): 273-
302; James Lenman, “Contractualism and Risk Imposition,” Politics, Philosophy & Eco-
nomics 7 (2008): 99-122; Fried, “Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?”; 
Aaron James, “Contractualism’s (Not So) Slippery Slope,” Legal Theory 18 (2012): 263-
92; Christopher Morgan-Knapp, “Nonconsequentialist Precaution,” Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice, published online 23 December 2014, DOI 10.1007/ s10677-014-9552-6. 
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ests in question when ignorant of one’s actual position, even if it reduces 
the overall value of expected outcomes.  
 However, it is unclear that “equal risk” is adequately motivated by the 
frame. Imagine that an agency can respond to a debilitating epidemic by 
developing and distributing Vaccine A, which will reduce the chance of 
infection for the entire population to .1, or Vaccine B, which will leave 
about 10% of the population with a .15 chance of illness, and 90% of the 
population with a .01 chance of illness. If I am equally likely to be any 
particular person, it appears rational to choose the profile of risk that op-
timizes expected outcomes,51 perhaps especially when all the interests in 
question are of basic significance. Moreover, equiprobability is facially 
recommended by the impartial decision position defined in section 4.a. 
The agency owes consideration to each actual subject’s dignity in the 
circumstances, so impartiality appears to render perfectly appropriate 
treating each social location as equally possible in the hypothetical frame. 
The efficiency interpretation of acceptable risk is not easily defeated. 
  Nonetheless, efficiency troubles, as it seems to matter how risk is 
distributed. A situation in which half of subjects have a .1 chance of inju-
ry and half a .02 chance appears less acceptable than one in which all 
subjects have a .06 chance of suffering the injury. Yet, efficiency treats 
them as equivalent.52 We might even be willing to tolerate some overall 
increase in risk to dignity for the sake of equity, e.g., .07 risk of injury 
for all. Moreover, the kind of inequality in risk distribution that the effi-
ciency interpretation (in principle) tolerates might appear at odds with a 
basic sense that human rights are partly individual trumps against collec-
tive aims. For “equity” to be a viable interpretation, however, it must do 
two things. First, it must show how the “separateness of persons” or “rec-
iprocity” or some similar moral constraint emerges from the basic com-
mitments of human rights. Perhaps this can be done in the theory of hu-
man dignity. Second, it must show how this constraint operates when we 
collectivize risks53 in the frame such that we have guidance as to when an 
unequal risk profile for an interest is unacceptable. I have attempted to 
structure the frame to permit a constraint on acceptability here, and to 
allow any intuitions regarding acceptable risk to operate, but it requires 
determinacy.  
 These brief comments are intended to illustrate the large degree of 
                                                        
 51The basic point has been familiar since John Harsanyi, “Cardinal Utility in Welfare 
Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,” Journal of Political Economy 61 (1953): 
434-35. For illuminating discussion, see Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search 
of Bases for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 52For more elaborate cases, see Lenman, “Contractualism and Risk Imposition.” 
 53For some relevant considerations, see James, “Contractualism’s (Not So) Slippery 
Slope.” 
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convergence in what the standards require, rather than settle an appropri-
ate interpretation. In the vaccine case, efficiency and equity might require 
different policies (depending on how, precisely, the equity constraints are 
defined), but both register the following (all else equal) as human rights 
violations: (1) failure to enact public health policies that enhance the ef-
fectiveness of the vaccination, (2) distributing any alternative vaccine 
(e.g., a cheaper one) that leaves the infection rate above .1 generally, and 
(3) doing nothing to mitigate the threat of infection. In other words, the 
remaining indeterminacy in the risk standard acceptable in the hypothet-
ical frame concerns hard cases operative at the level of fine-tuning a re-
sponse to a threat, or sitting at the margins of our policy-making.54 Ac-
ceptable risk, as defined by the hypothetical frame, renders determinate 
human rights claims for sizeable arenas of political practice, leaving such 
discourse capable of being meaningfully operationalized as a normative 
system.  
 Have I simply collapsed human rights into contractualist or conse-
quentialist approaches to political morality? No, these considerations 
arise as answers to the hypothetical frame. Human rights will supply a 
normative commitment to human dignity—the theory will provide an 
independent account of why human dignity mandates our concern, in the 
sense of constricting the scope of permissible exercise of discretion. It 
will also settle the domain of interests that is the scope of that concern. 
We appeal to impartial acceptance, as a contractualist device, at a differ-
ent theoretical level: to settle, in a principled way, how to accommodate 
the competing demands of multiple subjects in a risky interactive envi-
ronment. So although impartiality here will specify the content of the 
human rights duties for agencies once we identify the protected interests, 
it will not ground the protection of those interests. The hypothetical 
frame is a procedure that responds to what we have assumed are the 
well-grounded demands of human dignity and hones our attention to 
matters relevant from the standpoint of the multiplicity of demands in a 
given context. For instance, the argument that we give for protecting cer-
tain interests as a matter of respecting human dignity could be deontic in 
character: that these interests trump or preempt certain other valuables in 
the domain of political decision because of the moral importance of hu-
man dignity, but require efficiency in risk mitigation among themselves. 
The basis for the duty to protect would not be utilitarian, but the duty 
would require utilitarian-like efficiency with respect to protected interests.  
 
 
                                                        
 54It is difficult, for instance, to imagine a real-world scenario approximating a .1/.02 
vs. .06 decision. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Human rights have become an important feature of the discourse of in-
ternational morality. We should, I think, welcome the critical vantage 
they offer our politics and law. However, the warmth of our welcome 
should be predicated on our ability to show that human rights claims are 
meaningful in a way that can assist practical political reason, and be re-
sistant to manipulation. This requires demonstrating that there is a prin-
cipled way to understand what they require, and to evaluate the sorts of 
human rights claims adduced at the start of the paper. My aim here is to 
be a subpart to that effort, by introducing some determinacy into the el-
ement of dutiful action. Given the context-dependence of proper agential 
responsiveness to standard threats, it will frequently be difficult to dis-
cern violations. However, if successful, the approach does make dis-
cernment a possibility, and this is crucial for human rights to perform the 
important functions of a viable international morality.55 
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